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Theoretical and methodological principles of regional geography researches in scientific heritage of M. Holubets

This article is devoted to the study of history and regional geography researches of Ukrainian scientist of the interwar period Mykola Holubets. His scientific heritage is rich in regional geography explorations of the historical cities of Galicia; the researches of the history of Lviv form a separate group of his works. The purpose of the article is to analyse the theoretical and methodological principles which the scientist used as the foundation of his regional geography works. In his articles he pondered the meaning of regional geography as a science, the purpose and key principles of research, outlined his own vision of the topicality of the implementation of regional geography explorations. He made an attempt to classify regional geography resources, identified the main factors hindered the development of regional geography campaigns, made historiographical review of Ukrainian and Polish regional geography literature, highlighted the important components of regional geography studies, emphasized the problem of preservation of historical and cultural heritage of the region. These complex tasks were assigned by M. Holubets to regional geography science in the 20–30s of the XX century.

Keywords: Mykola Holubets, historical regional geography, interwar period, history and regional geography researches, theoretical and methodological principles.

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УДК 94(439)«1990/2016»

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THE RISE OF THE FAR–RIGHT IN HUNGARY (1990S–2016)

The article deals with the growth of far–right movement in Hungary, first of all of Jobbik party. Shown is its activity in the last decade, its program principles and international policy, including its attitude to the European Union, the United States, Russia, and, especially, Ukraine. Singled out are the party's traits which draw mass support of the Hungarian population. Displayed are its methods of mobilization of the electorate, especially the young.

Keywords: Jobbik, the Hungarian Guard, Gypsies, Jews, Russia, Ukraine, the EU, Ukraine's Hungarian minority, nationalism, immigration.

(стаття друкується мовою оригіналу)

The far right is again on the rise in Europe. The 2014 European parliamentary elections clearly show the impressive growth (over 50 percent) of the popularity of the European far–right parties compared to the previous elections of 2009. The growth of political influence of the far–right movement in Europe in recent years is a phenomenon caused mostly by immigration. Hungary has not experienced a serious inflow of immigrants, thus the growth of the far–right movement in Hungary is caused mostly by other reasons, though immigration also played a significant role. The study of the Hungarian far–right movement is important for Ukrainians since it will help them better understand general trends of far–right movements in Europe and Ukraine. For example, Ukraine's Svoboda party has many traits typical of far–right parties in the European Union. Besides, there is a possibility that the far–right will come to power in Hungary in the foreseeable future. Thus, studying the Hungarian far–right is a topical subject.

The far–right movement in Hungary is represented, first of all, by the so–called Jobbik party (the «Movement for a Better Hungary») whose popularity has been constantly growing since its inception in 2003. As a result of the 2014 Parliamentary elections, Jobbik polled 20% of the total

vote that made it the third largest party in the Hungarian parliament. That was the best result of all Europe's right-wing parties in recent years.

The growth of Jobbik's political influence draws attention of analysts in many countries. Various aspects of the party's activity are analyzed in the works of such political analysts as N. Nogradi [1], J. Kirchick [2], G. Schopflin [3], M. Varda [4], B. Whelan [5], and others. Most analysts explore Jobbik's internal issues, especially its attitude to Jews, Gypsies, and LGBT persons. The aim of this article is to show the growth of Jobbik's political influence beginning from its inception in 2003, single out the party's traits which draw mass support of the Hungarian population, display the party's attitude toward the European Union, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine.

The roots of Jobbik can be traced back to 2002 when it appeared as an offshoot youth organization of the moderately right-wing Fidesz party. Its full name at the time was «Right-Wing Youth Community». In October 2003 it was transformed into a political party under the name «Movement for a Better Hungary» or Jobbik.

For the purpose of getting into parliament in the 2006 elections, Jobbik formed an alliance with the «Hungarian Justice and Life Party» (MIEP), a far-right nationalist political party founded in 1993. MIEP's ideas were in many respects similar to those of Jobbik, namely, nationalism, anti-Communism and anti-Semitism; restoration of Hungary's pre-Trianon borders; criticism of the IMF, the EU, the United States, Israel and multinational corporations. Its major base of support was (in contrast to Jobbik that tried to appeal first of all to the young city dwellers and rural population of the poor eastern regions) the elderly middle class urban voters who lived in wealthy city districts [6, p. 218–219]. MIEP managed to get to parliament in 1998 with 5, 5% of the vote, but failed in 2002 when it gained only 4.4%. A third partner in the alliance was the «Independent Smallholders Party» (FKgP). The alliance, however, failed to get to parliament. After this failure Jobbik decided to act alone and managed to win over almost all former supporters of the MIEP party. In fact, it became the major representative of the Hungarian far-right movement and in 2010 it managed to get to parliament with 12.2 percent of the votes.

The years from 2002 till 2006 in the history of Jobbik are often called «dark years» by its current leadership [4, p. 794]. The party was supported by only 2 percent of the population at the time. The things radically changed in late 2006, as a result of a violent protest caused by the leak of information from the then governing Socialist party. The leaked to the press documents showed how the Socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany manipulated public opinion during the 2006 election campaign. In the fall of 2006 tens of thousands of right and far-right demonstrators clashed with the riot police, defeated them and ravaged the headquarters of the national television [4, p. 795]. During the time of this violent riot Jobbik took over the role of MIEP in organizing mass protests. The MIEP leader, Istvan Csurka, was booed by the crowds when he tried to speak.

In response to the government's refusal to resign after the revelation of the leaked documents, Jobbik set up the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Garda) to mobilize the public around its ideas. The Guard showed the determination and strength of the new far-right party, its ability to

take decisive and bold actions. The black uniforms and symbols of the Hungarian Guard resembled those of the fascist movements in the 1930s and brought accusations of fascism from some of the press. However, the Guard was a successful idea and led to a significant increase in Jobbik's popularity, especially among the young. The growth of Jobbik's popularity after the violent events of 2006 is impressive. In the 2009 European parliamentary elections the party got 427,773 of the vote; in the 2010 Hungarian parliamentary election it received 855,436 and over a million (1,020,476) in the election to the Hungarian Parliament in April 2014 [4, p. 793].

In 2007–2009 the Hungarian Guard was widely used by Jobbik for mobilization of the population on anti-Roma issues. The Guard's numerous marches against «Gypsy crime» brought Jobbik much publicity in the press and hence popularity among the public in general. Most analysts believe that the establishment of the Hungarian Guard brought Jobbik much more popularity than its program. Wide-spread anti-Gypsy sentiments in Hungary were skillfully used by Jobbik leaders for mobilization of the population. Roma or Gypsies comprise according to different data from 5 to 7 percent of Hungary's population and its number is constantly growing due to high birth rates [7, p. 331]. Some demographers predict that due to high birth rates the Gypsies may become the majority by the end of the 21st century. For example, in 1996 in the town school of Gyongyospata there were 46 Gypsy children out of 250; in 2011 the number of Gypsy children was 110 out of 200 [8, p. 49]. Jobbik accentuates that there are forms of crime specific for the Gypsy such as theft of scrap metal, knife-fighting, mass involvement in fights, etc. [4, p. 709]. Before it got to parliament, Jobbik stressed that Roma have a genetic predisposition to crime, that criminality was in the Gypsy blood [9]. After getting to parliament, to avoid accusations of racism, Jobbik started to claim that it is Roma culture (socio-cultural background), not ethnicity that encourages crime [4, p. 800]. Many Hungarians, especially in the villages, feel offended by the significant welfare given to large and idle Roma families. Besides, it is practically impossible to integrate Gypsies into Hungarian society. Even the communist government failed to do that. Gypsies rejected numerous benefits and refused to be assimilated. Hungarian political establishment cannot solve this problem since they are expected to be «politically correct.» As a result, frustrated Hungarians turn to the radical Jobbik, which proposes a simple solution to isolate Gypsies in ghettos and pay them welfare only if they would keep their houses and gardens clean and send their children to school. The school is regarded by Jobbik as an important tool for assimilation [10]. Gypsies are usually accused of petty criminal activity and parasitic way of life at the expense of welfare programs. «Who does not work also should not eat», – stressed in Jobbik's political program. Thus, Gypsies are typically portrayed as very different from «tax-paying, hardworking Hungarians» [1]. The Gypsy question is an excellent opportunity for Jobbik to mobilize population. Most Gypsies live in dire poverty and experience all kinds of discrimination. A survey conducted in 2011 showed that three quarters of Roma male population and almost 90 percent of the Gypsy women of the working age were unemployed [9]. Jobbik's statements about the Gypsy crime do not look groundless. According to a police report,

«almost all cases of theft in rural areas and about 70 percent in towns and cities were related to Roma people» [11, p. 122].

In 2009 the Hungarian Guard was forbidden by the authorities, but it soon revived under different names. The most known is the New Hungarian Guard. Jobbik's leaders officially deny their connections with these paramilitary structures, but it is not a secret who is in charge of these paramilitary groups. After 2009 the Guard still helped Jobbik to continue its original policies. The most notable of such events occurred in 2011 when the New Hungarian Guard organized anti-Roma mobilization in Gyongyospata. As a result, the Gypsies had to abandon the town, the anti-Jobbik mayor resigned, and a new mayor, a member of Jobbik, was elected in the ensuing local elections [4, p. 803].

Jobbik's ideology has touched the hearts of many Hungarians. It reflects dissatisfaction of many Hungarians with the policy of the European Union. When Hungary joined the EU many Hungarians hoped for radical improvements in their living standards. It did not happen. Since 1989 Hungary has been going through deep social, political and economic transformations which shake the country. The communist legacy is still felt in Hungary. Many people raised under communism are passive and have collectivistic mentality; they failed to adjust to capitalism with its new technologies, liberalism, and individualism; they still believe that the government should solve their problems. Similar tendencies can be traced in Eastern Germany, the territory of the former communist German Democratic Republic. Capitalist transformations deepened class divisions and enhanced social tensions in Hungarian society. According to the survey conducted by Pew Research Center in Hungary in 2009, 72 percent of respondents believed that life was better under communists, and 77 percent were dissatisfied with democracy in general [6, p. 229]. Jobbik actively plays on these feelings of frustration and advocates secession from the EU. It blames Brussels for multiculturalism and globalization, which will «destroy Hungary's uniqueness and independence». According to Gabor Vona, Jobbik's leader, the EU wanted Hungary to join the union only to make Hungarians slaves and get cheap workforce. Jobbik promised to protect «ordinary people» from the havoc of neoliberal capitalism. The number of voters with rightist views is constantly growing in Hungary. In 1994 only one-fifth of the Hungarians held rightist views; in 2009 over 50 percent were inclined to the right and 24 percent to the far-right [10]. In the foreign policy, Jobbik proposes to look to the east, first of all, Russia, China, India, Turkey, and Iran. In 2012 Jobbik's representatives symbolically burned the EU flag in front of the EU mission in Hungary [10].

In 2009 three representatives of Jobbik were elected to the European Parliament where they founded the so-called Alliance of European National Movements which united far-right groups from several countries. From December 2013, the leader of the alliance is Bela Kovacz, a Jobbik representative. Ukraine's Svoboda party joined the Alliance as an observer. On February 1, 2011, Bela Kovacz told in an interview to a Ukrainian newspaper «Старий замок Паланок» about close cooperation and similarities between Jobbik and Svoboda parties. In March 2014, however, Svoboda left the alliance after it had supported Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

Jobbik's ideology appeals to the patriotic feelings of its electorate by the stress on the Historical Greater Hungary, as it looked before the First World War. Hungary lost about 70 percent of its previous territories as a result of the war. Jobbik tries to represent itself as protector of all ethnic Hungarians who live outside of the country's present borders. Today about 2.5 million or one-fourth of the Hungarians live outside Hungary, mostly in Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine. Nostalgia for the «glorious past» is quite widespread in Hungary. James Kirchick, an American-Jewish analyst, was shocked during his first visit to Hungary by «the prevalence of bumper stickers and postcards depicting Greater Hungary» [2]. Jobbik actively publishes and spreads these maps for the aims of its propaganda. The party insists on giving Hungarian passports to all ethnic Hungarians and advocates «reunification» of former territories. At the same time the party insists that Hungarians who live abroad should remain on their territories and should not try to immigrate to the mother country. In such a way Jobbik tries to retain Hungarian influence in the former territories with the further aim of reunification in the future. Jobbik seems to advocate the ethnic concept of nation, rather than the political one.

Many Hungarians are drawn to Jobbik because of the so-called Jewish issue. Anti-Semitism has deep roots in Hungary which has the third biggest Jewish population in Europe [12]. Jobbik leaders try to play on the emotions of frustrated Hungarians who seek a simple explanation to their failures in careers. Jobbik's rhetoric of «Israeli occupation of Hungarian business» and the «world Jewish conspiracy» warms the hearts of such people. In 2013 a representative of Jobbik in the Hungarian parliament «called for Jewish citizens to be registered separately by the authorities as potential national security risks» [12]. On May 1, 2013, Jobbik organized an anti-Jewish meeting in Budapest attended by «thousands of ultra-right wingers» [12]. Jews are often accused of promoting cosmopolitanism with the aim of coming to power which they need to destroy Hungarian values and exploit the country's resources [1]. In contrast to many other far-right parties in Europe, Jobbik, at least till the 2015 refugees crisis, spoke favorably about Muslims, especially Iranians and Palestinians, apparently because of the shared hatred of Israel. Jobbik leaders also try to deny the Holocaust or at least lessen its effect. They call it unrealistic or at least heavily exaggerated. It is estimated that about 600 000 Jews perished in Hungary under the fascist regime. In demonstrations organized by the Jobbik party numerous posters presenting the Holocaust as a fake can be seen all around the country [1]. In 2011 Gergely Kulcsar, a Jobbik MP, called the Holocaust a lie and spat on a Holocaust memorial [13].

The issues of Roma and Jews are constantly stirring up by Jobbik. Some of Jobbik MPs even said that Gypsies are a biological weapon of the Jews [9]. Jews in Jobbik's propaganda became external enemies while Gypsies the internal ones. This rhetoric of internal and external enemies helps Jobbik in mobilizing its radical electorate. These two groups in fact play the role of important ethnic «others» who are needed for splitting society and mobilization of its radical groups. The Jewish reaction to Jobbik's anti-Semitic policy is rather strong, since Jews are much more organized internationally than Gypsies. The World Jewish Congress that was held in Budapest in May 2013 urged Hungary to

«crack down on the far-right Jobbik party». In a resolution passed by the Congress the Jews stated that «Budapest must recognize that Jobbik poses a fundamental threat to Hungary's democracy» [14]. A number of surveys showed that from 2010, the time Jobbik came to parliament, the anti-Roma and anti-Jewish sentiments in Hungary started to grow considerably [9].

To justify its anti-Jewish and anti-Roma policy and to unify Hungarians, Jobbik applied the political philosophy of Turanism, which gives an ideological background to the statements about the racial peculiarity of Hungarians and to the slogan «Hungary for Hungarians!» According to the Jobbik leader, Gabor Vona, «an alliance based and developed on the principles of Turanism instead of the Euro-Atlantic alliance would be more effective in serving the needs and interests of our nation» [2]. Turanism is not a Jobbik invention. It was used in the 1930s by the Hungarian fascists and other far-right groups to demonstrate the uniqueness of the Hungarian nation «which originated from the Ural-Altaic race». However, this stress on the pagan Ural-Altaic race is tightly intertwined with the stress on Christianity and Christian values. Christianity in Hungary, and not only there, is often used for inspiring nationalist feelings among the masses. In the words of Hungarian analyst Noa Nogradi, «Christianity and nationalism are closely bonded in Hungary, a traditionally Catholic country» [1]. Jobbik advocates studying Christian ethic in schools, spreading the influence of the Catholic Church in the army, prisons, educational institutions, etc. The stress on Catholic values leads Jobbik's leaders to criticism of various modern «deviations» such as homosexuality, transvestitism, bisexuality etc. In 2012 the Jobbik faction in Parliament submitted a bill banning the «promotion of sexual deviations». The bill called for prohibition of positive presentation of LGBT behaviors in the media. The offered punishment was an 8-year term in prison. However, due to resistance of other factions the bill did not pass [9]. Jobbik also advocates for reintroduction of death penalty, ban on abortion, removal of bums from public places, and stricter punishment for crime in general.

Recently with the evolvement of crisis in the Middle East, which caused the flood of refugees to Europe, Jobbik decided to actively play on the fear of immigration to mobilize and enlarge its electorate basis. Immigration in Jobbik's rhetoric is often associated with terrorism («immigration and terrorism go hand in hand»). Jobbik stressed that the EU was not able to protect itself from immigration and thus terrorism; that is why it was the task of Jobbik to do that. In November 2015, Jobbik organized a demonstration in front of the Representation of the European Commission in Hungary under the slogan: «We don't want immigration! We don't want terrorism!» [15]. Gabor Vona proclaimed that immigrants flee not directly from war zones, but from refugee camps in safe countries; thus they were interested not so much in security as in a better life. Jobbik considers the EU's idea about quotas and relocation of immigrants across the EU as absurd. In 2015 the party put forward an idea to hold a referendum on quotas. The idea of referendum was criticized by Jobbik's rival party Fidesz and by its leader Viktor Orban. A year later, however, the leader of the ruling Fidesz party decided to implement the idea of referendum for mobilization of the electorate. The referendum was held in October 2016.

By holding the referendum, Fidesz demonstrated that it can adopt the ideas of its rivals to attract right-wing electorate. After the last elections of 2014 Jobbik became the second most powerful force in Hungarian politics and the major rival of the ruling Fidesz party which has already implemented at least 10 ideas proposed by Jobbik [16]. Jobbik's anti-immigration rhetoric had some positive points, however. It led to consolidation of the Hungarian nation and the growth of national consciousness. Immigration scared many Hungarians, who started to pay more attention to the cultural differences between immigrants and themselves and better understand the values which unite the Hungarian nation.

Many liberal politicians in Europe justify immigration by the demographic crisis. Europe is getting older year after year and has fewer and fewer children. Thus, soon it would be very difficult for the EU's economies to support the aging population. Jobbik believes that such attempts to solve the demographic problem with the help of immigration will lead to the clash of cultures. Jobbik offers its own recipe for solving the problem of the elderly in Europe. Instead of immigration, Jobbik proposes «residential construction and housing developing program» [17]. It will stimulate the young to produce more children, Jobbik believes. Similar solutions are proposed by Ukraine's Svoboda party.

Besides the EU leadership, Jobbik also blames the United States for unleashing the conflict in the Middle East that brought hundreds of thousands of immigrants to the EU during the last several years. This criticism plays into the Kremlin's hands. Russian president Vladimir Putin tries to use European radicals to split the EU and he maintains cordial relations with the Hungarian right and far-right. In 2013 the leader of Jobbik, Gabor Vona, was invited to visit Moscow. The Jobbik web site presented the visit as a critical breakthrough which «clearly demonstrated that Russian leaders consider our party their partner» [18]. Jobbik constantly criticizes Hungary's Euro-Atlantic relations and that pleases the Kremlin well. Jobbik called the dubious referendum in Crimea in the spring of 2014 a «sample for imitation» and hope for Transcarpathian Hungarians and sent its observers to the peninsula [19]. Gabor Vona expressed a wish for Hungarians to leave the EU and join Putin's Eurasian Union instead. The Jobbik faction in the European parliament voted against the associated agreement between the EU and Ukraine. Jobbik faction in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe expressed statements that pleased the Kremlin much. Namely, that Crimea is Russian and Transcarpathia is Hungarian, that Ukraine is an artificial state and the Ukrainian government is illegitimate. It called the Euromaidan in Kyiv a putsch organized by the US intelligence services and expressed sympathy to the separatist republics in eastern Ukraine. The Jobbik faction also stated that Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia must get a status of full regional autonomy [20]. Jobbik recognized the elections held in self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic in 2014 and sent observers there. The people who live in these so-called republics were called by Jobbik «the local Russian community with Ukrainian citizenship» [21]. Kyiv correspondingly was accused of violating of fundamental rules of democracy by «waging a war on its own citizens» [21]. In concert with the Kremlin, Jobbik advocated federalization of Ukraine [22]. In May

2016, the party stated that «Jobbik has always urged to lift the sanctions from Moscow as well as to develop closer ties with Russia» [23]. The cooperation between Jobbik and the Kremlin was so clear that some analysts in the West started to doubt Jobbik's independence [24]. Thus, it does not look strange that in October 2015, the European parliament accused a Jobbik representative Bela Kovacs of espionage in favor of Russia and deprived him of parliamentary immunity.

After the Brexit, Jobbik started to advocate the creation of «Europe of nations». Thus, according to its official statement, «the European Commission and European Parliament should be subordinated to member states and national governments, and given coordination powers at most» [25]. Such statements please the Kremlin which is very much interested at least in weakening the EU's strength.

Jobbik does not seem an unusual phenomenon for Hungary. The right ideas are quite widespread in the country. Hungary does not have a long history of democratic traditions. It used to live for a long time under monarchy, dictatorship, and even had an experience of a direct fascist rule. Even relatively recently in 2008 a general population survey showed that 75 percent of respondents believed that their country should be governed with an iron fist by a strong leader [26]. Thus, it will probably take a long time for liberal ideas to take firm roots in the country. It likens Hungary to Ukraine to some extent. It is possible to draw parallels between the ideologies of Jobbik and Ukraine's Svoboda party. They have such common traits as homophobia, anti-Semitism, anti-globalism, state control over strategic sectors of the economy, policies of order, criticism of immigration and European integration policies, populism, patriotic and confrontational rhetoric, glorification of the past, firm pro-family policies, anti-abortion issues, anti-Communism, torchlight processions, etc. Between 2009 and 2014 the relations between Jobbik and Svoboda were quite cordial. In 2014 after the Russian aggression against Ukraine and Jobbik's support of the Kremlin's policy the relations became strained. In February 2015 in Budapest there was a torchlight procession organized by HVIM (neo-Nazi youth organization) and Jobbik dedicated to the issue of Hungarian minority in Ukraine. The Hungarian far-right opposed the campaign for military conscription in Ukrainian Transcarpathia. Istvan Szavay, Jobbik's vice-chairman, declared at the event that the United States and other western states should not provide Ukraine with military help. He also praised Sergey Lavrov, Russian foreign minister, for singling out Transcarpathian Hungarians of Ukrainian society [27].

In July 2016 Jobbik expressed solidarity with the Polish Sejm's statements on the Ukrainian nationalists in the time of the Second World War and condemned the «chauvinist» Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) for «the anti-Polish atrocities that claimed the lives of around 100 thousand people» during the so-called Volhynia massacre. The statement reads: «Jobbik respectfully commemorates the Polish people murdered by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during World War II» [28]. The statement does not mention the «retaliating actions» of the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa) against thousands of Ukrainian peasants. All blame was placed exclusively on Ukrainians.

Jobbik is constantly demanding «full territorial autonomy and the relating rights for self-governance

in terms of language use, education and culture» for Hungarians that live in Ukraine [28]. In general, Jobbik practically always condemns the external and internal policies of the Ukrainian government. The Hungarian-speaking minority in Ukrainian Transcarpathia amounts, according to different data, from 150,000 to 200,000. Hungary in many ways has been trying to support this minority from the early 1990s. Dozens of thousands of Ukrainian Hungarians have obtained Hungarian citizenship. In 1994 Budapest established the Ferenc Rakoczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute, a private institute of higher education which is also totally financed by Hungary. The language of instruction there is Hungarian. With the aim of supporting Hungarian education and culture in the area Budapest pays cash benefits to health and education workers who speak Hungarian. About a hundred of Hungarian schools and kindergartens in the region are supported by the Hungarian government. The Hungarian parliament has established special business grants for Hungarian-speaking businessmen who start their businesses in the region. Thus, Budapest has been conducting a policy in Ukrainian Transcarpathia which corresponds to Jobbik's wishes, namely, to encourage ethnic Hungarians to stay in the area.

Rumors of the popularity of Hungarian separatist ideas in Transcarpathia became especially widespread in 2014 when Russia attacked eastern Ukraine and Jobbik declared that the lands of Transcarpathia should be returned to Hungary. In fact, such rumors seem to be exaggerated. «This is a multicultural land of peace. It is a very big mistake to think that we are separatists», said Karolina Dorcsi, a professor of political science at the Ferenc Rakoczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute [29]. On the other hand, ethnic Hungarians of the region «asked the local government to create a special Hungarian district that would include all the main population centers where Hungarian communities live» [29]. They submitted an appeal to the region council, but it has been under consideration over half a year already. Probably the authorities do not want to give more rights to the Hungarian minority for political reasons. «We'll see how the situation with special status for Donbas ends. If the Russian minority gets special rights, all the minorities will get them», said Dorcsi [29].

The Jobbik party has achieved an especially impressive success in mobilizing the young through the Internet. The young, people under 35, comprise over 40 percent of the Jobbik voter base [26, p. 23]. As well as in other European far-right parties Jobbik's supporters are predominantly men. They comprise 66 percent of the party's voters [26, p. 23]. To attract the youth, Jobbik has created a modernized youth subculture: folk music and «national rock» festivals, summer camps, various clubs and events, uniforms, stylish t-shirts and fashion brands, etc. The party also pays considerable attention to the issues of material concern important to the youth such as unemployment, college scholarships, housing, etc. [30, p. 21]. Another important factor that attracts the youth to Jobbik is that the party leadership is predominantly young, mostly in their 20s and 30s. It seems that Jobbik's young leaders better understand the needs of the young. The party is especially popular with the youth who vote for the first time [31].

Previous analyses indicate that most adherents of the far-right parties in Europe, including Hungary, were rural

inhabitations and not very well educated town dwellers. However, recent data show that urban and well educated strata are becoming more chauvinistic and receptive to far-right ideology [8, p. 11]. According to a 2015 poll, Jobbik was the most popular party with university students [32]. Jobbik is also Hungary's most popular party online, «getting the most 'likes' and having the broadest reach [32]. Jobbik created networks which are independent from the mainstream media, so the government cannot influence them.

In general, after the elections of 2014 Jobbik has been moving from its radical positions toward the political center. Recently Jobbik leaders quite often deny accusations of anti-Semitism and xenophobia. Moreover, they have offered apologies for the statements and actions of some of the party's most radical members [33]. In such a way, Jobbik is getting more serious chances to win the parliamentary elections of 2018. Jobbik's softened policy is also revealed in its so-called roundtables with intellectuals. Thus in September 2016 at such a roundtable attended by around 150 well-known and influential intellectuals, Gabor Vona spoke about building bridges between different groups in society and laying foundations for so-called modern conservatism. The aim of modern conservatism is to «create a balance between order and liberty so we could achieve external and internal freedom» [34].

Summing up the material we can make some conclusions.

Jobbik sharply reduced the desire of immigrants to settle in Hungary. Immigrants usually do not go to the countries with strong far-right movements.

Jobbik has become especially popular with the young. Jobbik is a young party with young leaders that actively use innovative methods of mobilization (Internet, creating a youth subculture, etc) Most of the party's activity is aimed at the young. Thus, the party has good perspectives for the future.

The example of Jobbik shows how the far-right can influence the center right (Fidesz) which adopted and implemented a number of Jobbik's ideas.

Jobbik is gradually giving up its most extreme rhetoric, trying to attract broader segments of the population. It has real chances to come to power in 2018 either alone or in the form of coalition with Fidesz. If it comes to power, the party will probably soften its radical pro-Russian, anti-Euro-Atlantic, and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. Perspectives for relations with Ukraine look not very good, however. The hottest issue will be the question of granting broad autonomy to the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia.

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Піднесення крайньо-правого руху в Угорщині (1990-і – 2016 р.)

Розглядається зростання популярності крайньо-правого руху в Угорщині, перш за все, партії Йоббік. Показано її активність в останнє десятиліття, програмні принципи та міжнародну політику, включаючи її ставлення до Європейського Союзу, США, Росії, та, особливо, України. Визокремлено характерні риси які забезпечують партії широку підтримку угорського населення. Продемонстровано методи крайньо-правих для мобілізації електорату, особливо молоді.

Ключові слова: Йоббік, Угорська гвардія, євреї, цигани, Росія, Україна, ЄС, угорська меншина в Україні, націоналізм, імміграція.

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УДК 930.1:[94:929 Хмельницький](477)«16»

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ОБРАЗ БОГДАНА ХМЕЛЬНИЦЬКОГО В МАТЕРІАЛАХ XXIV ВСЕУКРАЇНСЬКОЇ НАУКОВОЇ ІСТОРИКО-КРАЄЗНАВЧОЇ КОНФЕРЕНЦІЇ «КОЗАЦТВО В ІСТОРІЇ УКРАЇНИ (ДО 360-РІЧЧЯ БИТВИ ПІД БАТОГОМ)»

Проаналізовано образ Б. Хмельницького, окреслений у матеріалах XXIV Всеукраїнської наукової історико-краєзнавчої конференції «Козацтво в історії України», присвяченої 360-річчю битви під Батогом. Історіографічне значення цього збірника полягає в тому, що в ньому представлено найновіші історико-краєзнавчі дослідження з історії козацтва за останні п'ять років. Характерною особливістю опублікованих матеріалів є те, що в більшості з них фігурує постать Б. Хмельницького, рішення та вчинки якого спричинили низку подій української історії середини XVII ст.

Ключові слова: образ Богдана Хмельницького, історико-краєзнавчі дослідження, матеріали конференції, сучасні історики.

У червні 2012 року на базі інституту історії, етнології та права Вінницького державного педагогічного університету імені Михайла Коцюбинського відбулася XXIV Всеукраїнська наукова історико-краєзнавча конференція «Козацтво в історії України», присвячена 360-річчю битви під Батогом. За результатами роботи конференції видано збірник, який уміщує понад шістдесят наукових статей з різних аспектів історії українського козацтва. Характерною особливістю опублікованих матеріалів є те, що в більшості з них фігурує постать Б. Хмельницького, рішення та вчинки якого спричинили низку подій української історії середини XVII ст.

Метою цієї статті є узагальнення рис образу Б. Хмельницького, окреслених у наукових статтях вищезазначеного збірника.

Одним з образів гетьмана, відтвореним на сторінках видання, є портрет непримиренного борця з

католицизмом. На думку С. С. Богатчук, головною метою Б. Хмельницького, який очолив усенародне повстання 1648 р., був захист православної віри та ліквідація унії. Б. Хмельницький постає оборонцем Православної Церкви, людиною, яка не втручалася у її внутрішні справи, але ставилася до неї з пошаною. Унаслідок встановлення між державою і Церквою дружніх партнерських відносин останню звільнено від податків [1, с. 14].

Кмітливим та обережним політиком, який хотів скористатися внутрішньою кризою в Польщі та заручитися підтримкою сусідніх держав, постає Б. Хмельницький у публікації Є. С. Горб. Автор доводить, як тільки Б. Хмельницький отримав звістку про смерть короля Владислава IV, то одразу ж звернувся до московського царя Олексія Михайловича, заохочуючи його до кандидатури на престол і обіцяючи військову допомогу. Є. С. Горб переконаний, що це було нещире бажання гетьмана: очевидно, він хотів втягнути царя у війну з Польщею [2, с. 66]. Б. Хмельницький пильно стежив за ходом виборчої боротьби в Речі Посполитій. Дослідник показує гетьмана симпатиком слабого, вихованого за кордоном, але чужого шляхетським звичаям Яна Казимира, якому Б. Хмельницький відправив листа, де обіцяв у разі потреби підтримати його кандидатуру зброєю. Також Б. Хмельницький вислав листа до мешканців обложеного Замостя, у якому висловлювалися думки щодо швидшого вибору короля, яким, на переконання гетьмана, мав стати Ян Казимир. Проте ці листи, впевнений Є. С. Горб, не можна вважати широкою підтримкою від гетьмана Військо Запорізького. Той знав устрій Речі Посполитої і мав добре розуміти, що король не може вирішувати важливі справи без сейму та сенату [2, с. 67].

Намагаючись втягнути у війну проти Польщі ще й Семиграддя, Б. Хмельницький у листопаді 1648 року закликав семигородського князя Дьордя Ракочі чим швидше вислати своє військо на Польщу й обіцяв незабаром рушити зі своїми полками йому на підмогу. У листі до князя Ракочі гетьман, певною мірою, виглядав демагогом, адже згадував щасливі часи панування короля Стефана Баторія, який походив зі Семиграддя і ставився до козаків з великою прихильністю. Однак усі ці плани залишилися лише на папері [2, с. 67]. На переконання О. П. Григоренка та С. М. Єсуніна, вступивши 1648 року в переговори з польським урядом, Б. Хмельницький припустився помилки: погодився відвести селянсько-козацьку армію в східні і центральні райони України [3, с. 54].

В аналізованому науковому збірнику вміщено низку публікацій, присвячених битві під Батогом 1652 р. Автори називають цю битву найяскравішою сторінкою воєнного мистецтва Б. Хмельницького, вершиною його полководської майстерності, вказують на об'єктивне оцінювання ним політичного становища. Воєнний талант Хмельницького в битві під Батогом порівнюють з перемогою Ганнібала над римською армією під Каннами [4, с. 9].

Науково-методичне зацікавлення викликають перевидані «Методичні поради студентам з вивчення Жовтоводської, Корсунської, Пилявецької, Зборівської й Батозької битв», підготовлені професором Вінницького державного педагогічного університету імені Михайла Коцюбинського М. М. Кравцем у 1981 році. Докладно